Persistent Democracy

A maximally responsive, flexible, and ethical foundation for democratic society.

very fast talk!

- just casting out threads
- persistentdemocracy.org has more
- "Democracy doesn't have to suck" on youtube has more

talk structure

- mechanics of Persistent Democracy
- proposed benefits
- specific projects

mechanics

Persistent Voting

- "voting weights" one "places" on different decisions
- can move weights at any time
- candidates can enter/exit at any time

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needs corrections to avoid becoming:

- tiring (will I end up voting every 5 minutes?) periodic update schedule
- unstable (will the mayor change every hour?) stabilization buckets
- noisy (will elections get spammed with candidates?) nomination buckets
- impractical (how will this actually work?) logistics

periodic update schedule (not tiring)

instead of publishing changes immediately...

voters making changes



election results being recalculated and published

periodic update schedule (not tiring)

... some arbitrary "sample rate" (Monday at 1:00 am)

voters making changes



election results being recalculated and published

stabilization buckets (not unstable)

incentivizes increased participation/confidence




stabilization buckets (not unstable)

are "bigger" (more stable) if:

- election potentially effects more people
- electorate is more "spread thin", have more available elections?


nomination buckets (not noisy)

not as sure how necessary this is



nomination buckets (not noisy)

not as sure how necessary this is



logistics (not impractical)

- must be computer assisted
- UI design is open question
- identity checks and privacy can vary on context
- blockchains actually useful here?

logistics (not impractical)

for government?

- voting office (same building as post office and library)
- proctor checks your id (was free and easy to get)
- private booth with a voting computer
- view all elections and your current votes
- change your votes

Persistent Logistics

Proof of Social Trust


logistics (not impractical)

for non-government

- can just use the internet!
- groups can decide identity/privacy strictness


Persistent Commitments (briefly)

not enough time to talk about this!



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proposed benefits

avoids deadline problems

- voter suppression is easy
- marketing/misinformation are cheap/effective
- voter turnout matters
- "election hangovers" are common
- weird surprises are irreversible

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why?

- Persistent Voting unifies election and "polling"
- safely reveals preferences
- all converge to most strategic vote

benefits of resource voting


votes signal **concern** and **confidence**

- votes are finite
- choosing one thing more means choosing another less
- choosing one thing means you care more about it
- makes voting a true negotiation
- negative votes allow non-experts to give useful information
- allows delegation by abstention


Persistent Documents

- propose in entirety (no random inconsistent amendments)
- can work together to merge compatible documents
- voters can view "diffs" between similar documents

constitution splitting




constitutional tree



levels would effect stabilization buckets

constitutional districts



allows arbitrarily flexible governance


- solves the "meta" problem
- allows arbitrary direct/delegated balance
- allow voting weights to be used in many ways
- truly ethical democracy without degressive proportionality
- similar to consent systems

Persistent Democracy

Persistent Voting + Constitution Tree

Resource-scaled score voting (briefly)

(Quadratic Range Voting)



resource complements score (briefly)

- resource voting for relative concern about *elections*
- score voting for alignment with *candidates* in elections

resource complements score (briefly)

- resource voting for inherently incomparable abstract options
 - preference strength signal
 - game-theoretical soundness
- score voting for possibly equivalent or comparable concrete options
 - preference alignment signal
 - strategic monotonicity, split-proof (IIA)

gracefully degrades to score with few elections

specific projects

Persistent Democracy tools

- github.com/persistent-democracy/tools
- Rust implementations of core algorithms, eventually UI and voting server
- Persistent Democracy PolicyKit plugin?
- currently wrangling with constitution tree "migrations"

Open Project Cooperatives

- open source software especially
- patrons/contributors have voting weights
- constitution determines maintainers, issue prioritization, etc
- perhaps "sponsorware" thresholds to guard:
 - source access
 - license rights
 - convenient/performant deployment
- "constitution buyout" could implement Exit-to-Community
- like to use to manage Magmide proof language